How did North Korea steal $6.36 billion from Binance?
TRM Labs thinks the attackers controlled the system that signs Binance's withdrawals and used it to make genuine signatures that sent the money out. No encryption was broken.

The 2026 Binance hack
On October 29, 2026, attackers drained Binance’s online “hot” wallets of about $6.36 billion across ten blockchains. That figure is TRM Labs’ value at the time of theft. Binance says about $6.3 billion and Chainalysis says $6.4 billion. Most of it left in about twenty minutes, starting at 20:05 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). On October 31, 2026, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) blamed North Korea’s TraderTraitor unit.
No encryption was broken. On most chains the attackers sent ordinary signed transfers. On the main Ethereum hot wallet they used EIP-7702 (Ethereum Improvement Proposal 7702), a standard feature that lets an ordinary wallet run contract code. It went live with the Pectra upgrade on May 7, 2025.
What a wallet signature actually controls
A wallet’s money moves only when its key signs, or when code the key approved runs. Binance’s early probe pointed to a compromised engineer’s laptop. It found no evidence that a private key leaked, though Mark Karpeles disputes this. Binance has not published a root cause. TRM Labs’ working theory is that the attackers controlled the system that signs withdrawals.
With the signer in hand, XRP Ledger, Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Base and a second Ethereum hot wallet were emptied by standard signed transfers. The main Ethereum hot wallet was different. There the signer produced EIP-7702 authorizations. Each one is a signed message holding a chain_id, an address and a nonce. It says “run the code at this address” and travels inside a type 0x04 transaction.
How the EIP-7702 drain worked
- Fifty authorizations, signed early. The signer made fifty authorizations in advance, all pointing at the attacker’s draining contract. Each had to match the wallet’s counter, the
nonce, and routine withdrawals kept moving it, so they covered fifty consecutive nonces. - One transaction, one match. At 20:20 UTC a single transaction delivered all fifty. Exactly one matched, and the wallet’s code became a 23-byte pointer:
0xef0100plus the contract’s address. - A sweep without signatures. Three minutes and 24 seconds later, the attacker’s operator called the wallet. The wallet ran the sweeper code and moved 167,464 ether (ETH) plus 63 tokens, with no Binance signature needed.
- The pointer stayed put. Later deposits were swept too, in six re-sweeps between 20:41 and 23:56 UTC. Binance revoked the delegation around 00:10 UTC on October 30.
The result: one genuine signed message turned a Binance wallet into a tool that obeyed only the attacker’s operator.
A heist this size is not cracked encryption
Many people assume a theft this big means someone broke the cryptography. It didn’t. Every signature was genuine. The attackers didn’t need the key because, in TRM Labs’ view, they controlled the system that uses it. Control the signer, and you don’t need the key.
What to do
- Never run a recruiter’s test app on a computer where your work logins or wallets live. TraderTraitor often starts with fake job offers and trojanized apps.
- Treat an unexpected job offer as a possible spearphishing lure.
- If you run a crypto service, block the TraderTraitor-linked addresses the FBI has asked to be blocked.
- Guard the system that signs as carefully as the keys. On Ethereum,
cast codefrom Foundry shows whether an address’s code starts with the0xef0100delegation pointer.
Watch it in 60 seconds
