How does DNSSEC prove a DNS answer is real?
DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) signs DNS answers. A validating resolver checks those signatures from the root down and rejects a forged address, as long as the domain is signed.

DNSSEC
Before any page loads, your device asks a DNS resolver where the site lives. DNS stands for Domain Name System, and the resolver is the lookup server that turns a name into a numeric IP (Internet Protocol) address. A plain DNS answer carries no proof of who sent it. In 2008, the Kaminsky bug showed that attackers could forge those answers and poison a resolver’s cache, its memory of recent answers.
DNSSEC, the Domain Name System Security Extensions, is the fix: answers get signed. RFC 4033 describes it as origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data, plus a way to share public keys. A resolver that checks these signatures is called a validating resolver. It can tell a genuine answer from a forged one, but only when the domain is actually signed.
What DNSSEC actually checks
The bank’s DNS host signs each record set with a zone signing key (ZSK). That key is published as a DNSKEY record with flag 256. The signature itself is stored in an RRSIG (resource record signature) record. A second key, the key signing key (KSK), has flag 257 and signs the set of DNSKEY records. That’s how it vouches for the zone signing key.
A digest of the KSK, the DS (Delegation Signer) record, sits one level up in the parent zone. For a .com domain, that’s .com. The .com zone is in turn vouched for by the root zone. The root zone’s KSK is stored in your resolver as the trust anchor, the starting point it already trusts.
How the chain of trust works
- The resolver starts at the root. It checks the root zone’s keys against the trust anchor it already holds.
- The root vouches for .com. The root holds the
DSrecord for .com, so the key of that top-level domain can be trusted. - .com vouches for the bank. The bank’s
DSrecord in .com matches the bank’s KSK, which signs the zone signing key. - The answer’s signature is checked. The
RRSIGon the bank’s address record must be valid for the zone signing key.
If every link is valid, the resolver returns the answer with the AD (Authenticated Data) flag set. If one signature is bad, a validating resolver discards the answer and returns SERVFAIL (server failure). So you get an error instead of a forged address. That strictness cuts both ways. On May 5, 2026, only one .de key (tag 33834) was published, so only about a third of the signatures could be validated. Many .de sites failed to load for about three hours.
DNSSEC is not encryption
DNSSEC encrypts nothing. RFC 4033 says plainly that these extensions do not provide confidentiality, so it can’t hide which sites you visit. It also provides no protection against denial-of-service attacks. It proves only that the address in the DNS answer is genuine, not that the page is real. A perfect copy on a lookalike domain is untouched by DNSSEC. In the browser, the main thing that proves the server’s identity is the HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) certificate. And if a domain isn’t signed at all, a forged answer is accepted and no error appears.
What to do
- Run the connection test at internet.nl. Press Start test and look for the line “DNSSEC: are domain signatures validated for you?”
- If signatures aren’t validated, switch your DNS to 1.1.1.1, which validates them. On Windows 11, go to Settings > Network & internet > your adapter > DNS server assignment > Edit > Manual. Then turn on IPv4 (Internet Protocol version 4) and enter 1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1.
- Check the domain name before you log in, because DNSSEC can’t catch a lookalike domain.
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