What is Kerberoasting and how does it work?
Kerberoasting is an attack where someone with any employee account requests Kerberos service tickets, takes them away, and guesses the service account's password offline, with no failed logins.

Kerberoasting
Kerberos is the sign-in system behind Windows networks at work. When you log in, a Windows server called a domain controller hands you a pass, a Kerberos ticket. Later, when your PC needs a file share or a database, it asks the same server for a service ticket for that service. Kerberoasting abuses this normal step, and MITRE tracks it as technique T1558.003. In 2024, attackers inside Ascension, a US hospital system, used it to take over privileged Active Directory (AD) accounts, and data on 5.6 million patients was stolen.
The defense that closes the gap is a Group Managed Service Account (gMSA). A gMSA is a service account whose password is 120 random characters, managed by Windows instead of a person. It exists because human-chosen service passwords are the weak spot.
What Kerberoasting actually does
The domain controller runs the Key Distribution Center (KDC), which listens on port 88. Once you’re signed in, you hold a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). To reach a service, your PC sends a TGS-REQ (message type 12) naming the service’s Service Principal Name (SPN). The KDC answers with a TGS-REP (message type 13) carrying the service ticket. That ticket is encrypted with a key made from the password of the service’s own account. Any signed-in domain user may request a ticket for any SPN.
That’s the opening. An attacker who hijacks one employee’s account requests these tickets, takes them away, and guesses the password offline. The guessing never reaches the domain controller, so there are no failed logons and no lockouts. How fast it goes depends on the encryption type. With old RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4), the key is a single unsalted MD4 (Message Digest 4) hash of the password, so each guess is cheap. With AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), the key comes from 4,096 salted rounds, so each guess costs thousands of times more work.
How defenders shut Kerberoasting down
- Replace human-chosen passwords. Move service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts. Their 120-character random passwords are managed by Windows, so there’s no weak password to guess.
- Watch Event 4769 closely. Windows logs Event 4769, “A Kerberos service ticket was requested,” when a service ticket is requested. This is where the attack becomes visible.
- Flag RC4 ticket requests. A Ticket Encryption Type of
0x17means RC4-HMAC, the cheap-to-guess kind. Those requests deserve a closer look. - Spot one user pulling many. One account requesting tickets for many services, or for unusual accounts, is a stronger signal than any single event.
Together, these steps remove the weak password and make the ticket requests visible. Detection alone can’t stop the guessing, because it happens offline. Strong random service passwords stay the core fix.
AES is not a full fix
Many people assume that turning on AES ends Kerberoasting. It doesn’t. AES makes each guess far more expensive, but a weak password is still a weak password. Microsoft says it plainly: “A weak password can still be brute forced even if AES is used for encryption.” What really protects a service account is a long, random password that no person chose.
What to do
- If you run a domain, move service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts with 120-character random passwords.
- Find the service accounts that still use passwords a person chose, and put them first in line.
- Alert on Event 4769 with Ticket Encryption Type
0x17, and on one user requesting many service tickets. - Guard your own work account and be careful with links. In the Ascension case, it started with a contractor’s laptop infected through a malicious link.
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