What happens when the root DNS key changes?
When the root Key Signing Key (KSK) changes, every validating DNS server must already trust the new key, or it fails every lookup, because all DNSSEC signatures trace back to that one key.

Root KSK rollover
DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) lets DNS (Domain Name System) answers carry signatures, so a forged answer gets caught. Every signature traces back to one root key, the Key Signing Key (KSK). The KSK signs only the root’s own set of keys. A separate Zone Signing Key (ZSK), operated by Verisign, does the rest. Every validating DNS server stores the root key’s fingerprint. That stored fingerprint is called the trust anchor.
The old root key, KSK-2017, has key tag 20326. Its replacement, KSK-2024, has key tag 38696. KSK-2024 began signing on October 11, 2026, at 14:00 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). Swapping the key is called a rollover. The key wasn’t hacked. ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) moved to new hardware security modules (HSMs), and that move required a new key.
What a validating server actually checks
A validating DNS server follows every signature back to the root. At the top, the root’s DNSKEY set must be signed by a key that matches the trust anchor it stores. If it matches, the answer is trusted. If it doesn’t, the server can’t trust anything. It answers every name with SERVFAIL (server failure). For the people using that server, Wi-Fi is connected, but nothing loads.
How the rollover worked
- The new key appeared early. On January 11, 2025, key 38696 was published in the root zone beside key 20326. That was about 21 months before it started signing.
- The old key vouched for it. Under RFC 5011 (Request for Comments 5011), a server saw the new key vouched for by the key it already trusted. After a hold-down of at least 30 days, it moved the key from
AddPendtoValid. - The new key took over. On October 11, 2026, at 14:00 UTC, key 38696 started signing the root
DNSKEYset. - The caches ran out. The root
DNSKEYset has a TTL (time to live) of 48 hours. Unready servers kept working on cached copies until about October 13, 2026. Then they failed every lookup.
A server that followed RFC 5011 already trusted the new key when it mattered. The risk is real, though. In 2017, the first rollover was postponed from October 11, 2017 to October 11, 2018. Data showed 6 to 8 percent of reporting validators trusted only the old key.
A key rollover is not a hack
Many people hear “the master key was replaced” and assume it was stolen. It wasn’t. The new key was needed because ICANN moved to new HSMs. The danger of a rollover isn’t an attacker. It’s a validating server that never learned the new key and so rejects every answer.
What to do
- Run the RFC 8509 sentinel test from your network. The
is-ta-38696name should answer and thenot-ta-38696name should fail. That shows your DNS server trusts key 38696. - If you run Pi-hole or dnsmasq with DNSSEC, remember they use static
trust-anchor=lines and don’t apply RFC 5011 updates themselves. Make sure the line holds key 38696, copied from IANA’s officialroot-anchors.xmlfile, never from a shortened on-screen example. - If Wi-Fi is connected but nothing loads and lookups return
SERVFAIL, check the DNS server’s trust anchor first. - Mark the next dates. The old key 20326 is revoked on January 11, 2027 and removed on March 22, 2027.
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